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Abstract 
After the floatation of the baht on July 2, 1997, the Thai economy endured a financial crisis 
from massive currency devaluation, exchange rate losses, and non-performing loans 
(NPLs). In response, the Thai government employed two types of restructuring programs: 
(1) the alleviation of NPLs and distressed assets, (2) the correction of financial institution 
insolvency and capital inadequacy. To help recapitalize private institutions with public 
funds, the government introduced tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities. The tier-1 
facility aimed to attract private capital, and the tier-2 facility aimed to stimulate lending 
and corporate debt restructuring. Capital injections took the form of voluntary securities 
exchanges: the Ministry of Finance (MOF) exchanged government bonds for preferred 
shares (tier-1 capital) or subordinated debt (tier-2 capital). MOF was authorized to issue 
up to B300 billion in government bonds to pay for the tier-1 (B200 billion) and tier-2 
(B100 billion) facilities. To cover the government’s financing costs, authorities set interest 
and dividend rates on financial institutions’ securities above the coupon rates of 
government bonds. As conditions for receiving the government’s investment in the tier-1 
facility, the government reserved the right to replace participating banks’ management and 
required the banks to first write off bad debts, potentially imposing steep losses on existing 
shareholders. With uptake around 24.6% of the available total, the program was largely 
unused. The Thai government amended the program in 1999 and counted the preferred-
share portion of hybrid securities as part of match-able tier-1 capital. 
 
Keywords: Capital injection, August 14 Package, Thailand Financial Sector, Capital Support 
Facilities, Asian Financial Crisis 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the Asian Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injections. 
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At a Glance 
One year into the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the Thai financial sector 
struggled to raise capital from 
private markets. The Thai 
government offered temporary 
capital assistance to financial 
institutions while partnering with 
private investors. Authorities opened 
two voluntary capital support 
facilities to banks and finance 
companies deemed potentially viable 
by the BOT, the tier-1 program and 
the tier-2 program. The Financial 
Restructuring Advisory Committee 
(FRAC), which was a high-level 
consultative body made of public and 
private-sector representatives, 
received and reviewed applications, 
monitored the capital support 
facilities, and issued detailed 
guidelines for participating in the 
programs.  
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
purchased preferred shares in the 
tier-1 program and subordinated 
debt in the tier-2 program. MOF 
funded the programs by issuing new 
government debt, which participating financial institutions were required to buy after 
MOF had purchased their capital under the program’s terms. To cover the cost of 
financing the programs, MOF mandated the preferred shares and subordinated debt to 
carry dividend or interest rates 100 basis points above the government bonds’ interest 
rates; although supported financial institutions were not always able to make the 
required payments. The amount of capital injections was dependent on matching capital 
raised with private investors (tier-1), and the amounts of debt restructuring, 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “The objective is to restore and maintain the 
solvency and credibility of the Thai financial system and, 
most importantly, to enable the financial institutions to 




August 14, 1998  
Operational date October 1, 1998 – December 31, 
2000  
End of issuance 
window  
December 31, 2000  
Peak utilization  B73.7 billion 
Participants 13 finance companies 
Administrators Bank of Thailand, Ministry of 
Finance, Financial Restructuring 
Advisory Committee  
Notable features Separate participatory conditions 
for tier-1 and tier-2 capital 
support facilities; tier-1 
participants had to meet loan 
classification and provisioning 
requirements; preferred shares 
carried voting rights 
Thailand Capital Support Facilities 
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provisioning, and new lending (tier-2). The Thai government also issued covered 
warrants (“call options”) with tier-1 preferred shares to encourage private investors to 
participate and to provide the government with an exit strategy. 
Summary Evaluation 
Though the government allocated up to B300 billion for the capital support facilities, it 
ultimately utilized B73.7 billion (24.6%). Some scholars view the capital support 
facilities as ineffective because the uptake was low. With the program’s voluntary terms, 
harsh participatory requirements resulted in low participation. Authors suggest that the 
capital support facilities addressed consequences of non-performing loans (NPLs), but 
not their causes. Others argue that the government’s intent was to make its capital 
unattractive to encourage financial institutions to raise capital privately. As financial 
institutions avoided the government’s recapitalization program, they raised private 
capital by issuing short-term, high-cost hybrid securities. The Thai government later 
amended the tier-1 program in 1999 to allow banks to use those separately issued 
hybrid securities as the private-sector match for government tier-1 capital injections. 
One positive outcome was improved confidence in the Thai financial sector—indicated 
by upward trends in the Thai stock market and banking sector indexes following the 
announcement of the program. Though the program has ended, there is still a need for 
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Thailand Context 1998 
GDP $115.12 billion (current U.S.$) in 1998 
GDP per capita 
$1,846.00 (current U.S.$) per capita in 
1998 
Exchange Rate 
(Baht to USD) 
36.65 in 1998 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 
Fitch: BBB+  
Moody’s: Baa1  
S&P: A- 
Size of banking system $196.46 billion in total assets 
Size of banking system as a  
percentage of GDP 
170.66% in 1998 
Size of banking system as a  
percentage of financial system 
N/A 
Five-bank concentration  
of banking system 
70.0% of total bank assets in 1998 
Foreign involvement  
in banking system 
N/A 
Government ownership  
of banking system 
31% of bank assets owned by the state 
between 1999 and 2001 
Existence of deposit insurance None in 1998 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 









In the years leading up to the crisis in Thailand, high current account deficits exposed 
local corporations to foreign exchange and market risks, and the banking system 
underestimated credit risk (Nimmanahaeminda 1998). The currency market and 
financial system suffered runs in 1996 when exports underperformed. In response, Thai 
authorities defended the value of the baht and supported insolvent institutions, which 
depleted the government’s foreign reserves. The government allowed the Thai baht to 
float on July 2, 1997, which led to currency devaluation (Satitniramai 2007). The 
business sector suffered massive losses (Satitniramai 2007). Despite the announcement 
of an IMF support package in August 1997, market confidence plummeted because 
investors did not trust policymakers’ statements (Nimmanahaeminda 1998). Issues with 
government transparency and accountability created a contagion effect. 
Specific factors exacerbated the undercapitalization of the Thai financial sector before 
and during the crisis. Before the crisis, Thai authorities failed to regulate and supervise 
bank capital by holding banks to consistent definitions of classified and non-performing 
loans (NPLs) (Santiprabhob 2003). Speculative attacks on the baht limited the financial 
sector’s ability to recapitalize when the country entered the crisis in early 1997 
(Santiprabhob 2003). During the crisis, general economic contraction, the floating of the 
baht, high interest rates, and rising required loan-loss provisions all eroded financial 
institutions’ capital (Santiprabhob 2003). Capital inadequacy became a systemic issue 
that led the government to close insolvent financial institutions and explore various 
strategies to recapitalize potentially viable ones (Santiprabhob 2003). 
Beginning in 1997, the Thai government employed several drastic programs to combat 
the crisis (Santiprabhob 2003). Restructuring programs broadly fit into two categories: 
(1) measures to address non-performing loans and distressed assets, and (2) measures 
to address financial institutions’ insolvency and capital inadequacy (Santiprabhob 
2003).  
Between March and August 1997, the government extended liquidity support to Thai 
financial institutions through Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF) loans 
(Santiprabhob 2003). The government also introduced blanket deposit guarantees in 
August 1997 (Santiprabhob 2003). To end deposit runs and rein in the FIDF’s liquidity 
support, the Thai government suspended nearly two-thirds of Thai finance companies 
between June and August 1997 (Santiprabhob 2003). In November 1997, the Thai 
government also began to intervene in insolvent financial institutions before privatizing 
or merging them with one another (Santiprabhob 2003). During December 1997, the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) decided that two of the 58 suspended 
institutions could continue to operate if they recapitalized within 90 days—the rest 
were closed, and the FRA liquidated their assets (Santiprabhob 2003).  
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One year after the outbreak of the crisis, it became clear that private institutions faced 
barriers to recapitalizing themselves without public-sector support (Satitniramai 2007). 
On August 14, 1998, the government introduced a plan known as the “August 14 
Package” (the “Package”) to help private financial institutions recapitalize (Santiprabhob 
2003). The Package included B300 billion to purchase capital in distressed financial 
institutions through tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities (Santiprabhob 2003). 
Program Description 
As part of the Package, the capital support program began on August 14, 1998, and 
ended on December 31, 2000 (BOT 2000a). On August 14, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the program in a joint press release (Chaitrong 
1998). On September 29, MOF published details about applications and conditions of 
participation (Chaitrong 1998; BOT 1998b; BOT 1998a). Institutions could seek 
government capital beginning on October 1, 1998, and apply through November 1, 2000; 
the government could no longer purchase additional capital under the support facilities 
after December 31, 2000 (Santiprabhob 2003; Reuters Staff 1998b).  
The government passed an emergency decree on August 21, 1998, (effective August 24) 
enabling MOF to issue B300 billion of government bonds to fund the capital support 
program (BOT 1998a). From the B300 billion of total authorized funding, the 
government allocated B200 billion for tier-1 capital support and B100 billion for tier-2 
capital support (Finance Reporters 1999). The program targeted all banks and finance 
companies—regardless of their net worth or outstanding debt balance with the 
government (Koeberle and Sondergaard 1998c). 
Financial institutions published statements through the Stock Exchange of Thailand to 
indicate whether they intended to participate (Reuters Staff 1998c; 1999). The Minister 
of Finance occasionally announced the names of potential participants before they had 
formally applied for support (Agency France-Presse 1999). 
While the capital support program was active, the BOT changed relevant regulations by 
lowering the minimum tier-1 component of the overall capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 
gradually introducing loan-loss provisioning requirements, and relaxing constraints on 
foreign ownership of Thai financial institutions (BOT 1998a). 
The capital support program was comprised of tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). The tier-1 facility aimed to attract new private 
capital into Thai financial institutions (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). The 
government’s objectives were to remove the risk associated with bad loans, and to lay 
the groundwork for financial institutions to resume normal lending (Nimmanahaeminda 
and Sonakul 1998a). Through the tier-1 facility, MOF effectively exchanged tradeable 
government bonds for financial institutions’ preferred shares up to 2.5% of tier-1 CAR; 
thereafter, additional government capital injections had to be matched by private capital 
injections (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Conditions for tier-1 participation 
included: (1) the write-down of non-performing loans, through the full adoption of end-
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2000 loan classification and provisioning (LCP) rules, which could result in significant 
losses for existing shareholders; (2) the preferred status of new capital injections over 
existing shareholders; (3) the government’s and other new investors’ right to change 
existing management; and (4) the BOT’s approval of a restructuring plan 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). To incentivize private participation in the tier-
1 capital support program, the government issued three-year covered warrants on its 
preferred shares and gave them to participating investors, enabling them to purchase 
the government’s shares at the original purchase price plus carrying costs (Santiprabhob 
2003; Finance Reporters 1999). 
The tier-2 facility aimed to provide financial resources and incentives to speed up 
corporate debt restructuring and to restart lending (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 
1998a). Through the tier-2 facility, MOF exchanged non-tradeable government bonds for 
financial institutions’ subordinated debt (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; BOT 
2000a). The amount of tier-2 capital an eligible institution could receive was determined 
by the amount of losses related to debt restructuring, costs from increases in net lending, 
and total amount of risk-weighted assets (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). 
Conditions for tier-2 participation included legally binding debt restructuring 
agreements and proof of loan service for restructured debt (Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998a). Institutions that fully adopted the end-2000 LCP rules could phase 
write-offs related to debt restructuring over a five-year period (Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998a). 
Within the first six months of the program window, Thai Military Bank (a commercial 
bank) entered internal discussions with the BOT to change the program terms—with a 
focus on the program’s treatment of hybrid securities issuances (Kanoksilp 1999; TMB 
1999a). In June 1999, the government became willing to match preferred shares (tier-1 
capital) raised from separate hybrid securities issuances—not only from preferred share 
issuances conducted jointly with MOF (BOT 1999a). The BOT effectively expanded the 
list of matchable securities that financial institutions could issue to private investors, 
which was a requirement of the tier-1 facility (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a).  
While the program was running, BOT Governor Chatumongkol explored the option of 
forcibly recapitalizing financial institutions if their voluntary actions were not enough to 
recapitalize themselves (Koeberle and Sondergaard 1998c). 
The government designed the facilities so that returns from preferred shares and 
subordinated debt exceeded the government’s costs (Santiprabhob 2003). 
The government’s exit strategy for the tier-1 program was to sell its preferred shares to 
private investors (Santiprabhob 2003; The Nation Staff 1999a). The tier-2 program 








From the B300 billion authorized for the program, the government allocated B200 
billion for tier-1 capital support and B100 billion for tier-2 capital support (Finance 
Reporters 1999). As of mid-1999, the Thai authorities had approved B38.4 billion of 
program funding, which included B35.5 billion of tier-1 capital and B2.9 billion of tier-2 
capital (World Bank 1999). By end-2000, MOF had provided two commercial banks, one 
finance company, and one finance and securities company with B61.3 billion of tier-1 
capital (BOT 2000a). Three commercial banks and four finance companies received 
B12.4 billion of tier-2 capital (BOT 2000a). 
Of the committed funds, the government utilized about B73.7 billion (24.6%) (BOT 
2000a).3 Total uptake was lower than expected, as banks were wary of the provisioning 
requirements, which would likely have imposed losses on existing shareholders, and the 
right for new shareholders to change management (Keelan and Stubing 2001; 
Satitniramai 2007). Instead of participating in the government program, banks 
engineered new financial instruments to meet the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) while 
retaining control over their own management (Satitniramai 2007).  
The bond issuances for the capital support program were classified as public-sector debt 
(BOT 1999a). Through 2002, the Thai government bore interest costs on the tier-1 
facility because participants took losses and could not pay out dividends (Santiprabhob 
2003). Of the four companies that received tier-1 capital injections, the shareholders of 
only one—TISCO, the securities company—had purchased all of the government’s shares 
before the options expired; overall, a “limited number of participating investors” 
exercised their options because market prices remained below the government share 
purchase prices of the tier-1 preferred shares (Santiprabhob 2003). The government 
faced no cost from the tier-2 facility because the interest rates on subordinated debt 
were higher than government bond coupon rates (Santiprabhob 2003).  
  
 
3 The exact utilization rate varies from source to source. Santiprabhob (2003) suggested that 24% of funds 
were utilized, the Asian Development Bank (1999) suggested that 27% of total funds had been dispersed 
by June 1999, and the Bank of Thailand’s year-2000 Supervision Report suggested that the government 
used about 24.6% of funds (Santiprabhob 2003; ADB 1999; BOT 2000a). 
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II. Key Design Decisions 
 Part of a Package: The Thai government opened tier-1 and tier-2 capital 
support facilities as parts of a financial sector restructuring program called 
“the August 14 Package,” which was also accompanied by measures to alleviate 
distressed assets and non-performing loans. 
The Thai government’s attempts to restructure the financial sector fell into two 
categories: (1) efforts to solve problems of insolvency and capital inadequacy, and (2) 
measures to alleviate distressed assets and non-performing loans (NPLs) (Santiprabhob 
2003).  
Within the first category, the government suspended and closed nonviable finance 
companies, intervened in insolvent financial institutions, recapitalized private financial 
institutions, and recapitalized and restructured state-owned financial institutions 
(Santiprabhob 2003). Within the second category, the government liquidated assets of 
closed finance companies, reformed legislation on NPL resolution, and led both state and 
market-driven efforts on NPL resolution (Santiprabhob 2003). (Please refer to Dreyer 
[2021] for more information about the Thai government’s handling of distressed assets 
and NPLs.) 
On August 14, 1998, the government launched the “August 14 Package” (the Package), 
which was a program meant to recapitalize private financial institutions (Santiprabhob 
2003). Through the Package, the government offered two voluntary capital support 
facilities that required private institutions to write off bad debts in compliance with new 
regulatory requirements that would kick in at the end of 2000 (Santiprabhob 2003). The 
tier-1 support facility aimed to help institutions attract private capital to better handle 
losses, and the tier-2 support facility was intended to provide financial resources, 
quicken corporate debt restructuring, and foster new lending (Santiprabhob 2003; 
Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Other legal efforts to recapitalize private 
financial institutions included the liberalization of constraints on foreign ownership in 
November 1997, and Bank of Thailand’s (BOT) acceptance of hybrid securities as part of 
regulatory capital in 1999 (Santiprabhob 2003). 
During the early stages of the crisis response, the Thai government focused on capital 
adequacy and separating potentially solvent from insolvent financial institutions 
(Santiprabhob 2003). Santiprabhob (2003) argued that this disproportionate attention4 
meant that authorities paid too little attention to asset deterioration and NPL 
 
4 Santiprabhob (2003) partly attributed this to the government’s limited resources and finite abilities to 
respond to multiple issues simultaneously (Santiprabhob 2003). The author also acknowledged Thai 
authorities’ lack of a crisis management plan before the crisis, and the limited political will to employ 
several drastic measures at once (Santiprabhob 2003). In a 2017 interview, former Minister of Finance 
Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda compared crisis-policy prioritization to flying a plane with most of the engines 
shut down (Kotani 2017). 
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restructuring (Santiprabhob 2003). Other academics reported issues with the 
government’s regulatory treatment of assets and NPLs, which were closely related to the 
tier-1 and tier-2 programs. In a 2001 World Bank report, Patrick Honohan remarked 
that Thailand was slow to recapitalize and to dispose of non-performing assets 
(Honohan 2001). Private banks largely met phased-in loan-classification and 
provisioning by the end of 1999 (ADB 1999). However, banks still faced capital shortfalls 
because: (1) the book value of loans was overstated5 as banks overestimated the value of 
debtors’ collateral; (2) provisioning guidelines were backward-looking and not forward-
looking, which probably would have further decreased the quality of loans; and (3) CAR 
requirements underestimated the impact of both new and aging6 non-performing loans 
(NPLs) (ADB 1999).  
 Legal Authority: The government passed emergency decrees allowing the 
Ministry of Finance to issue debt for the purpose of conducting capital 
injections. 
During the crisis, the government passed several emergency decrees to lift general 
restrictions on government borrowing (Suthiwart-Narueput and Pradittatsanee 1999). 
On August 21, 1998, the cabinet of Thailand passed the Emergency Decree Allowing the 
Ministry of Finance to Borrow Money for the Strengthening of the Financial System 
(“Emergency Decree”), which (effective August 24) allowed the Ministry of Finance to 
borrow up to B300 billion to fund its tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities (BOT 
1998a). This funding window lasted through December 31, 2000 (Suthiwart-Narueput 
and Pradittatsanee 1999). Of the committed amount, the government utilized about 73.7 
billion baht (24.6%) (BOT 2000a).  
 Governance: The Thai Minister of Finance and officials from the IMF and World 
Bank designed the August 14 Package. 
As part of its crisis response, the Thai government established multiple aid packages 
with both the IMF and World Bank; one of the recurring shared goals of these packages 
was to recapitalize the Thai financial system (World Bank 2006; Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998b). Then-Minister of Finance Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, working with IMF 
and World Bank officials, designed the capital support facilities (Business Day 1999). In 
its fifth Letter of Intent (LOI) with the IMF, the Thai government introduced the capital 
support facilities and expressed confidence that the program provided incentives for 
financial institutions to join, while safeguarding against moral hazard 
 
5 During the first accounting period of 1999, the Thai government relaxed the criteria used to deduct 
collateral value from debtors’ accounts to “[make] collateral appraisal more suitable for the current 
conditions” (BOT 1999a). 
6 Starting on January 1, 1999, restructured loans could be reclassified as “substandard” or “pass” on the 
day of restructuring if the institution met certain criteria (BOT 2000a). The rules were [sic] “designed to 
reduce the potential financial burden on financial institutions during the period of high loans” (BOT 
2000a). While the ADB authors identified these changes as regulatory bugs, the Thai regulators 
intentionally designed them as features. 
673
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). On December 1, 1998, the seventh LOI 
explained that all finance companies and banks needing capital within the next six 
months were required to sign memoranda of understanding (MOU)—which included 
plans to recapitalize—by January 31, 1999 (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998b). 
The signing of MOUs on recapitalization was an IMF performance criteria, and all 
financial institutions had to sign them—regardless of their participation in the capital 
support facilities (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998c). To the surprise of some 
analysts, banks that held sufficient levels of capital were not required to sign capital 
rehabilitation plans with the BOT (Business Day 1999). Financial institutions could make 
use of the tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities to satisfy these MOUs 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998b). Banks and other financial institutions 
regularly signed MOUs at six-month intervals to address their capital needs through end-
2000 (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998c; 1999a; 1999b). The BOT had the right to 
intervene in any financial institution that failed to meet its MOU commitments (Lindgren 
et al. 1999). 
 Administration: The Bank of Thailand set the regulations relevant for capital 
injections, the Ministry of Finance funded the program, and FRAC supervised 
the program while it was underway. 
The BOT ordered suspensions, demanded capital raises, and set the regulations on 
capital and loan-loss provisioning (Santiprabhob 2003). The BOT was also the official 
registrar for public-debt securities, including government bonds, which covered the cost 
of capital support facilities (Ganjarerndee 2009; Rattakul 2003). The BOT regularly 
conducted audits of restructuring agreements, which were related to tier-2 capital 
injections (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) purchased participating institutions’ preferred shares or 
subordinated debt, and paid the participating banks with government bonds that 
financial institutions were required to purchase under the support facilities’ terms of 
participation (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; TISCO 1998; TISCO 1999). 
Consequently, MOF also owned the private capital, became the public stakeholder in the 
participating companies, and was entitled to jointly appoint or change the recipient’s top 
management (TMB 1999b). MOF had significant influence in designing the capital 
support facilities, setting its original terms, and suggesting amendments to the active 
program, which were then carried out by the BOT (BOT 1999b).  
On September 29, 1998, the cabinet of Thailand approved and set up the Financial 
Restructuring Advising Committee (FRAC) (Koeberle and Sondergaard 1998a). FRAC 
was chaired by a former deputy minister of finance, and staffed by officials from the 
BOT, MOF, and the private sector; and the BOT operated its secretariat (BIS 1999). As an 
advisor to both the BOT and MOF, FRAC generally oversaw the implementation of 
restructuring efforts (Lindgren et al. 1999; Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). 
FRAC received and reviewed tier-1 and tier-2 capital support applications (Srisukkasem 
1999; Reuters Staff 1998a). FRAC also controlled the budget dedicated to financial 
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institutions’ recapitalization, determined the purchase prices of preferred shares issued 
under the tier-1 and tier-2 facilities, and monitored the support facilities while the 
program was under way (BOT 1999a). FRAC also issued detailed guidelines for 
participating, and controlled the budget dedicated to financial institutions’ 
recapitalization (BOT 1999a). FRAC also arbitrated on any disputes regarding the 
amount of losses related to write-downs (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
 Funding Source: The Ministry of Finance funded the capital support facilities by 
issuing government bonds.  
The Emergency Decree authorized MOF to issue bonds to fund its capital support 
facilities; MOF effectively exchanged the bonds for preferred shares (tier-1) or 
subordinated debt (tier-2) (Suthiwart-Narueput and Pradittatsanee 1999; BOT 2000a). 
Before issuing government securities, MOF first had to obtain the cabinet’s approval for 
the bonds’ interest rates, terms, conditions, fees, expenses, and procedures regarding 
management, repayment, or changes to the government’s payment schedule (Emergency 
Decree 1998). After securing approval, MOF could allocate the proceeds from emergency 
issuances as it deemed fit—without needing to “deliver income” back to the government 
under the law on budgetary methods and the law on treasury (Emergency Decree 1998). 
MOF had to publish details about all emergency issuances in the Royal Thai Government 
Gazette within one month from the start date of the loan contract (Emergency Decree 
1998). MOF first purchased the securities from the tier-1 and tier-2 capital support 
participants and then sold government bonds to the same institutions in an amount 
equal to the purchase sum (TISCO 1998; TISCO 1999). MOF’s Public Debt Management 
Office (PDMO) managed the government debt issued to pay for the capital support 
facilities (Ganjarerndee 2009; Rattakul 2003). The statutory capital support bonds were 
classified as central government domestic debt (Suthiwart-Narueput and Pradittatsanee 
1999). 
 Communications: The Ministry of Finance announced the August 14 Package 
through press releases; rumors about financial institutions joining the 
program persisted.  
The government officially announced the August 14 Package through a joint press 
release with the BOT and MOF (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). The initial 
press release offered basic package details, such as the types of capital and participation 
limits, but omitted application details, such as guidelines for loan classification 
(Chaitrong 1998). Further details about capital support eligibility came in a press release 
on August 19, 1998 (BOT 1998b). The later press release clarified that the purpose of the 
capital support facility was to re-ignite financial institution lending to businesses (BOT 
1998b). According to an August 25, 1998, Letter of Intent with the International 
Monetary Fund, FRAC was scheduled to release a detailed guideline for capital support 
participation by September 30, 1998 (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998c). On 
September 29, MOF announced the eligibility conditions and pre-application 
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requirements for participation in the tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities (BOT 
1998a). 
Some banks endured months of press speculation about whether they would enroll in 
the capital support facilities (Kanoksilp and Keawkumnurdpong 1999). Through the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), financial institutions released statements confirming 
or denying their intent to participate (Reuters Staff 1998c; 1999). Some future 
participants included the level of capital while others omitted the total amount of 
support (Reuters Staff 1998c). There were real-time, negative market reactions to 
rumors of financial institutions joining the program (Reuters Staff 1999; The Nation Staff 
1999d). At times, Minister of Finance Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda announced the names 
of some banks that “would” apply to both tier-1 and tier-2 capital support facilities 
before they had formally filed applications with the BOT (Agency France-Presse 1999; 
Finance Reporters 1999). In other public statements, he acknowledged financial 
institutions’ interest in the facilities, but did not identify the potential participants by 
name (Finance Reporters 1999). 
 Size of the Program and Individual Participation Limit: The entire capital 
injection program was set at B300 billion; the individual size of tier-1 capital 
injections depended on regulatory minima set by the BOT. The size of tier-2 
injections depended on the cost incurred from debt restructuring and 
additional lending, and was set to decline over time.  
The size of tier-1 injections depended on the financial institution’s ability to meet 
regulatory minima set by the Bank of Thailand. After the institution met the full loan 
classification and provisioning standards (LCP) for end-2000 (including up-front write-
offs), the government injected tier-1 capital to satisfy the 2.5% capital adequacy ratio 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; Santiprabhob 2003; Lindgren et al. 1999). 
Above 2.5% CAR, the government only injected tier-1 capital if it was matched by private 
capital injections7 of equal or greater value (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; 
Santiprabhob 2003). The government did not specify limits on the amount of tier-1 
support for individual participants (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). 
 
7 Relying on the due diligence of private investors to determine the level of tier-1 capital contributions, the 
Thai government matched capital injections from both new and existing shareholders (Lindgren et al. 
1999). 
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The size of tier-2 injections was contingent on new loan extension and costs related to 
debt restructuring. The total amount of available tier-2 capital was equal to write-offs, 
the total amount of provisioning, and 20% of the net increase in outstanding private 
sector loans (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Though each participant was 
eligible to receive support equal to 2% of risk-weighted assets, tier-2 support for 
increased lending was capped at 1% of risk-weighted assets (Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998a). A single debt-restructuring agreement was not eligible for more than 
10% of the tier-2 support available to the institution (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 
1998a).  
Institutions could apply to the FRAC for tier-2 support at the end of each quarter by 
reporting any debt-restructuring agreement, original loan contract, and evidence that 
the borrower was able to service the loan (Lindgren et al. 1999). For temporary capital 
relief, tier-2 participants that met end-2000 LCP rules immediately could write off debt 
restructuring costs over a five-year period (20% per year); otherwise, tier-2 participants 
were required to bear the restructuring costs according to the existing regulation (full 
losses taken by end-2000) (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; Lindgren et al. 
1999). To further incentivize participation, early debt restructuring, and new lending, 
the availability of tier-2 capital decreased8 over the facility’s window (ADB 1999; 
Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). 
On August 21, 1998, the Thai government passed an emergency decree (effective August 
24) providing MOF the authority to issue up to B300 billion of bonds for the program 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998c). The government also had the authority to 
issue derivative warrants through SET to incentivize private participation the tier-1 
(Finance Reporters 1999). 
 Eligible Institutions: Banks and financial companies deemed “potentially 
viable” by the Bank of Thailand were eligible for the capital injection. 
The tier-1 scheme was only available to “potentially viable” commercial banks, finance 
companies9, or finance and securities companies incorporated in Thailand 
(Santiprabhob 2003; BOT 1998a). The BOT determined viability (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
To qualify for support, the financial institution had to submit an operational 
restructuring plan10, which FRAC and the BOT had to approve (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
Financial institutions intervened by the BOT (or those determined to be necessary in a 
merger process) had to first finish their restructuring plans to become eligible (BOT 
1998a). Before applying, financial institutions had to secure the approval of their Boards 
 
8 The original Thai press releases do not explain why the amount of available tier-2 capital decreased over 
time (BOT 1998b). 
9 “Finance companies are also eligible for the scheme, provided this is part of a consolidation process for 
the sector. Finance companies may apply to the scheme once BOT clarifies their entitlement to become 
full-fledged banks” (Koeberle and Sondergaard 1998b). 
10 Plans included measures to strengthen internal control and risk management, to increase revenues, to 
cut costs, and to improve internal procedures for alleviating non-performing loans (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
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of Directors for: (1) the request to participate, (2) the full provisioning requirements11, 
and (3) the issuance of an amount of preference shares to be sold to the Ministry of 
Finance and other joint investors (BOT 1998a). All tier-1 applicants had to have positive 
capital left after fully provisioning against their assets because the existing shareholders 
needed to bear the cost of NPLs prior to recapitalization (Santiprabhob 2003). 
The tier-2 scheme was only available to “potentially viable” commercial banks, finance 
companies, and finance and securities companies incorporated in Thailand—
irrespective of their participation in the tier-1 capital support facility (Lindgren et al. 
1999; BOT 1998a). The tier-2 scheme was available to capital-deficient institutions who 
had experienced losses from debt restructuring, and had increased lending to non-
speculative clients (BOT 1998a). Eligibility depended on a legally binding agreement 
between the debtor and the financial institution (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 
1998a). The institution also needed to prove to the BOT that the debtor was able to 
service its loans for three consecutive payment periods, or for at least three months 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Prior to submitting a tier-2 application, the 
financial institution had to secure approval from its Board of Directors for: (1) the 
request to participate in the tier-2 scheme, and (2) the issuance of an amount of 
subordinated debentures to be sold to the Ministry of Finance (BOT 1998a).  
 Capital Characteristic: (Tier-1 Mechanics): For tier-1 capital, Ministry of 
Finance received preferred shares in exchange for 10-year tradeable 
government bonds.  
Through the tier-1 capital support facility, the Ministry of Finance purchased preferred 
shares and sold tradeable12 government bonds (Lindgren et al. 1999). The 10-year 
government bonds paid a fixed interest rate: 100 basis points below the one-year 
deposit rate of the five largest Thai banks at the time of the transaction (Honohan 2001). 
The preferred shares carried equal voting rights with common stock, were non-
redeemable, non-cumulative, and convertible to common stock at the shareholder’s 
option once the participant had taken full provisions (Honohan 2001; The Nation Staff 
1999a). According to TISCO Finance’s annual reports, preferred shares could be 
converted at the end of every quarter at the ratio of 1:1 (TISCO 1999). Otherwise, the 
preferred shares automatically reverted to common shares ten years after the original 
date of purchase (TMB 1999b). This new capital had preferred status over existing 
capital (Lindgren et al. 1999). The tier-1 facility divided new preferred shares into class-
A and class-B shares (The Nation Staff 1999c). The government received class-B shares, 
which had priority over class-A in the event of dividends or returns from liquidation 
(The Nation Staff 1999c). Class-B shares were second in line to absorb losses on assets 
 
11 On March 31, 1998, the BOT revised regulations on the suspension of income recognition of accrued 
interest payments, loan classifications, and provisioning requirements to align Thai supervisory 
regulations with international standards by end-2000 (BOT 1998a). 
12 The Bank of Thailand was not allowed to hold these bonds (Honohan 2001). 
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that the underlying firm had acquired before issuing new shares (The Nation Staff 
1999c). Losses against new assets were written down against class-A and class-B shares 
proportionately (The Nation Staff 1999c). 
Some Thai banks recapitalized without participating in the government’s capital support 
facilities. They raised capital by issuing short-term, high-cost, hybrid securities called 
“Stapled Limited Interest Preferred Stock” (SLIPS) and “Capital Augmented Preferred 
Securities” (CAPS) (Scott 2002, 41; Santiprabhob 2003). Figure 2 depicts the flow of cash 
and securities between investors and banks that issued SLIPS/CAPS. Banks issued 
securities into mutual funds, which paired returns from non-cumulative preferred 
shares with perpetual bonds (Group 1 assets) and pooled high-yield subordinated bonds 
(Group 2 assets) (Santiprabhob 2003). On behalf of the banks, mutual funds sold 
investment units of SLIPS/CAPS to investors, who paid with cash; investors were 
required to purchase the bundled assets and could not select individual securities from 
within a group (Santiprabhob 2003). Thai financial regulators were willing to count 
group-1 assets as tier-1 capital because the subordinated bonds were perpetual, 
inseparable from the preferred shares, and could absorb losses; group-2 assets could 
count towards tier-2 capital if underlying bonds carried tenure longer than five years 
(Santiprabhob 2003). The mutual-fund structure enabled banks to raise regulatory 
capital while minimizing the dilution of outstanding shares (Santiprabhob 2003).  
Figure 1: Recapitalization Through the Issuance of Hybrid Instruments 
 
Source: Santiprabhob 2003. 
Responding to the upturn in global capital markets, the BOT clarified in late March 1999 
that issuers of hybrid securities would be allowed to count the preferred-share portion 
of the hybrid securities issuance as part of tier-1 capital—up to one-third of their total 
tier-1 capital (BOT 1999b). On April 26, 1999, the BOT announced that it was 
considering adjusting the capital support facilities by matching the SLIPS/CAPS 
issuances with tier-1 capital assistance but had not firmly decided on the terms of 
adjustment (Srisukkasem and Kanoksilp 1999). On June 12, 1999, the BOT and MOF 
became willing to match preferred shares issued in SLIPS and CAPS with tier-1 capital 
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issued on or after the start date of the tier-1 capital support facility (September 29, 
1998) as part of matchable tier-1 capital (BOT 1999a). These institutions could also 
apply to the tier-1 capital support facility for an amount no less than the tier-1 increase 
directly related to the SLIPS/CAPS issuance (BOT 1999a). Private holders of SLIPS/CAPS 
were not allowed to purchase MOF’s preferred shares13 (BOT 1999a). With respect to 
the financial engineering, the preferred-share portion of the “innovative capital 
instrument” could comprise a maximum14 of 25% of tier-1 capital on or after January 1, 
2000 (BOT 1999a). The government’s acceptance and matching of preferred shares 
separately issued in hybrid securities as tier-1 capital meant that private investors who 
already owned SLIPS/CAPS were also offered options on the government’s shares in 
financial institutions (World Bank 2000b). 
Some evidence suggests that the government was indifferent to banks’ methods of 
recapitalization—whether by public or private means. In press statement on April 26, 
1999, the Bank of Thailand reminded potential participants that the capital support 
facilities were one of several ways by which financial institutions could raise tier-1 
capital (Srisukkasem and Kanoksilp 1999). Financial institutions that opted to raise 
capital without government assistance often issued hybrid securities, which helped them 
to both satisfy regulatory capital requirements and attract domestic investors 
(Santiprabhob 2003). David Scott (2002) noted that fear of participating in the 
government’s capital support program stimulated private banks to search for capital in 
private markets, which improved bank governance in some cases, but not others (Scott 
2002). Other criticisms about private capital raises included the “excessive future cost” 
of short-term hybrid securities, which the government partially accepted through the 
tier-1 capital support facility (Root et al. 2000; Scott 2002; BOT 2000a). However, 
Santiprabhob (2003) argued that the hybrid issuances were relatively “low-cost capital,” 
given banks faced few opportunities to raise the same capital by issuing straight equity 
(Santiprabhob 2003). 
There appears to be little commentary about the tier-2 facility. One researcher noted the 
facility’s “negative arbitrage” component would consume a troubled bank’s cash if it 
were to participate (Harvey 1999). 
  Dividends/Pricing: (Tier-1 Pricing): The government purchased preferred 
shares at market prices, set the dividend rates on participants’ preferred 
shares above the interest rates on sovereign bonds, and issued three-year call 
options on the participants’ preferred shares. 
 
13 The Ministry of Finance sought to prevent private investors from receiving higher returns than private 
investors who jointly purchased preferred shares with the Ministry of Finance (BOT 1999a). 
14 The BOT lowered this limit from 33.33% to 25% (BOT 1999a). From the BOT’s perspective, 
improvements in stock market conditions meant that financial institutions should not have to rely on 
innovative capital instruments to raise more capital (BOT 1999a). 
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Under the tier-1 support facility, MOF agreed to purchase the preference shares at a 
“mutually determined fair value,” which could come from an individual company’s book 
value, market value, or an appraisal from an independent advisor hired by MOF (BOT 
AER 1999). In practice, the government relied on a combination of the first two 
measures: the purchase prices partially reflected market estimates, which were mostly 
based on each company’s book value—after accounting for the effects of full loan-loss 
provisioning and capital requirements (Santiprabhob 2003; BOT 1998b). FRAC was also 
responsible for determining the appropriateness of the price prior to the government’s 
purchase (BOT 1999a).  
Though the government could purchase shares for a price lower than par value15, the 
government did not have the authority to forcibly lower the participant share’s par value 
(BOT 1998b). 
The preferred share dividend rate was either the same as the common stock dividend 
rate, or 100 basis points above the government bond interest rate—whichever was 
lower—but the participant did not have to pay dividends during times of operational 
loss (Honohan 2001; The Nation Staff 1999a). Though the government could sell the 
preference shares, the original shareholders had a “right of first refusal” (Honohan 
2001). 
  Capital Characteristics: (Tier-2 Mechanics): For tier-2 capital, MOF received 
subordinated debt in exchange for 10-year non-tradeable government bonds.  
Through the tier-2 capital support facility, MOF funded its purchases of subordinated 
debt by issuing non-tradable government bonds (Lindgren et al. 1999). The 10-year 
subordinated debt paid an interest rate 100 basis points above the interest rate of the 
10-year government bonds, so returns from the capital support facilities covered the 
government’s financing costs (Lindgren et al. 1999; Santiprabhob 2003). If the 
participant’s tier-1 level fell below the specified regulatory minimum while it 
participated in the tier-2 scheme, the participant had the option to convert the tier-2 
subordinated bonds into the tier-1 preferred shares (The Nation Staff 1999a). 
In late 2000, the BOT allowed financial institutions to include hybrid debt instruments 
and long-term subordinated debt as part of their tier-2 capital, with minimum maturities 
of 10 years and five years, respectively (BOT 2000b). This reduced the amount of 
additional capital that these institutions would need from the government to satisfy 
 
15 Before the 21st century, companies used to issue common shares at “par value,” which reflected their 
investments in cash, goods, and services (Downes and Goodman 1985). Later, companies assigned par 
value to their newly-issued common shares to determine the dollar accounting value of those shares on 
their balance sheets (Downes and Goodman 1985). In this context, par value refers to the “original share 
price determined by the capital level recorded within the participant’s business registry record” (BOT 
1998b). For common and preferred shares, par value has no relation to the market value, which is 
determined by factors such as net asset value, yield, and investors’ expectations about a company’s future 
earnings (Downes and Goodman 1985). 
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their tier-2 capital requirements. For both securities, the financial institutions were 
required to annually amortize 20% of the capital during the five years preceding the 
maturity, and the BOT had to permit the financial institution to redeem early (BOT 
1999a).  
Commercial banks and finance companies did not have to pay interest on hybrid 
securities or pay dividends on common and preferred shares if they did not make 
operating profit (BOT 2000c). Postponement of principal and interest payments was 
only allowed when their payments would lead to a negative capital-to-risk asset ratio, or 
when the BOT intervened by ordering capital write-downs and recapitalization (BOT 
2000c). 
  Allocation of Losses for Shareholders: tier-1 participants wrote down capital 
for existing shareholders and permitted the government to change 
management and the board of directors. 
On October 24, 1997, the Thai government passed emergency decrees that amended the 
Commercial Banking Act and Finance Company Act, allowing the BOT to order capital 
increases or decreases, or to change the management of troubled financial institutions 
(Lindgren et al. 1999). The BOT wielded this authority in the capital support program by 
requiring tier-1 participants to agree to make full end-2000 provisions, effectively 
forcing existing shareholders to bear up-front losses (Lindgren et al. 1999; Honohan 
2001). Loan-loss provisioning and capital requirements ensured that the financial 
institution’s losses were absorbed by common shareholders before the government, but 
the government was first to receive profit (BOT 1998b).  
  Fate of Existing Board and Management: The government and new investors 
had the authority to replace the management and board of directors of tier-1 
participants.  
The government had the right to appoint board members commensurate with the size of 
its preferred share holding, and the right to nominate at least one board member 
regardless of the size of the holding (Lindgren et al. 1999; BOT 1998b). The BOT 
internally considered a policy that mandated the “revamp” of management (Srisukkasem 
and Kanoksilp 1999). For most tier-1 participants, the government changed the top 
management and appointed just one or two directors—despite having large shares of 
ownership in the participating institutions (Santiprabhob 2003). Banks16 were cautious 
of the management control that they would cede to the government if they were to 
participate in the tier-1 facility (World Bank 2000a).  
  Exit Strategy: MOF attempted an exit measure by offering covered warrants on 
government-owned preference shares; the subordinated bonds matured on 
their own and did not require additional steps for disposal. 
 
16 Family-owned banks especially feared government interference (Santiprabhob 2003). 
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To encourage private investment through the tier-1 capital facility, the government 
offered new share subscribers three-year covered warrants (“call options”) to purchase 
the shares that it acquired through recapitalization (Santiprabhob 2003; Finance 
Reporters 1999). MOF issued the warrants, arranged17 for their listing on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand, and required the companies to pay related expenses (TISCO 
1999). The exercise price on these options was equal to the government’s investment 
and holding costs over the three-year period, and investors who purchased preferred 
shares alongside the government could convert the warrants at a ratio of one warrant to 
one preferred share (Santiprabhob 2003; TISCO 2001). For at least one bank, Thai 
Military Bank, new ordinary-share investors received two covered warrants for every 
one new share they had purchased (TMB 2001). The options suggested that the 
government was a temporary investor, but that the government would not sell its shares 
to other investors during the three-year period (Santiprabhob 2003). If the market price 
rose above the exercise price, the options also provided the government with a natural 
exit opportunity (Santiprabhob 2003). 
In the case of at least one tier-1 capital participant, TISCO Finance, investors who bought 
preferred shares alongside the government executed nearly all of their covered warrants 
and effectively acquired the government’s preference shares before the options expired 
(Santiprabhob 2003; TISCO 2002). 
Tier-2 capital support participants sold subordinated debt with tenure, which provided 
for a natural exit opportunity after the instruments reached maturity. In September 
2002, MOF redeemed the bonds that it had sold to TISCO Finance as part of the tier-2 
capital support facility in 1999—nearly seven years before the government bonds were 
scheduled to reach maturity (TISCO 2002). 
Though the capital support facilities expired on December 31, 2000, there was no 
explicit exit strategy to dispose of the government’s remaining preference shares after 
the program ended and the covered warrants had expired. Following Santiprabhob 
(2003) and Thai newspapers, the government’s exit strategy was to sell its shares to 
private investors between four and six years after the beginning of the program 
(Santiprabhob 2003; The Nation Staff 1999a).  
  Exit Strategy: The Ministry of Finance subsequently offloaded some of its bank 
shares into a government-run mutual fund created in 2003. 
In 2003, the Thai government created two “Vayupak” mutual funds to invest in domestic 
corporations that were still facing financial burdens related to the 1997-98 Asian 
Financial Crisis (Crispin 2003; The Economist 2003). Suchart Jaovisidha, then-Minister of 
Finance, claimed that the move was meant to free up part of the THB 500 billion ($12 
 
17 During the crisis, the domestic secondary market for derivatives was not fully developed, so the Thai 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only authorized securities companies and large shareholders 
of Thai companies to issue derivative warrants (Finance Reporters 1999). 
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billion) that the government had invested in wholly and partially state-owned 
enterprises (The Economist 2003). The government seeded the first fund (“Vayupak 1”) 
with THB 100 billion in capital, purchased some of MOF’s shares of banks and other 
state-owned enterprises, and guaranteed a minimum 2% return to retail investors—
higher than the prevailing 1.25% bank deposit rate—because MOF promised to 
repurchase shares from the fund at a pre-arranged price after ten years (Crispin 2003; 
The Economist 2003; Pootpisut 2012). The government installed professional managers 
to direct the day-to-day operations of Vayupak 1, which traded publicly on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (The Economist 2003). 
After the Vayupak 1’s announcement, market participants had mixed opinions. 
Proponents believed that it could stimulate private investment, soak up excess deposits 
in commercial banks, and improve the management of government-owned businesses 
(The Economist 2003). Detractors expressed skepticism about the government’s 
financial savviness, potential economic inefficiencies, and the viability of the underlying 
companies (Crispin 2003; The Economist 2003). Vayupak 1 performed better than 
expected and delivered an average 6% annual return during its first eight years 
(Vanichkorn 2012). In 2012, the government announced that Vayupak 1 would become 
open-ended after the ten-year term had expired (Pootpisut 2012). Officials raised 
additional capital for the new fund, broadened its investments to include public and 
private infrastructure projects, and did not guarantee returns anymore (Pootpisut 
2012). 
  Amendment to Regulation: While the capital support facility was open, the 
Thai government altered loan-loss provisions, changed capital requirements, 
and relaxed restrictions on foreign ownership of Thai financial institution.  
To prevent banks from having future problems, the government raised supervisory 
standards and tightened regulations (BIS 1999). In 1998, new regulatory standards 
required banks and non-bank financial institutions to significantly increase their capital 
(Vichyanond 2004). Scholars of the Package also draw attention to new loan 
classification and provisioning (LCP) and capital requirements, in particular. 
On March 31, 1998, the BOT raised loan classification, provisioning, and reporting 
standards to bring Thai financial institutions in line with international standards by end-
2000 (Vichyanond 2004). Loan classification became contingent on debtors’ debt 
servicing capacity, cash flow management and valuation of back-up assets, and ageing of 
overdue debts (Vichyanond 2004). By the time that the capital support facilities opened 
in late 1998, financial institutions were adjusting to the following requirements:  
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Figure 2: Loan-loss Provisioning Requirements for Commercial Banks 
Loan Classification Months Overdue Previous Provisions 
(%) 
1998 System of 
Provisioning (%) 
Pass < 1 month - 1 
Special Mention 0-3 months - 2 
Substandard 3-6 months 15 20 
Doubtful  6 months – 1 year 100 50 
Loss > 1 year 100 100 
Sources: Table 1 adapted from Vichyanond 2004. Information originally sourced from the Bank of Thailand. 
Beginning in the second half of 1998, Thai government phased in these standards, 
requiring financial institutions to meet an additional 20% of required provisions every 
six months during the “transitional period,” until they fully satisfied requirements by 
end-2000 (ADB 1999). The type and amount of capital injections depended on how 
quickly financial institutions met these end-2000 LCP rules (Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998a). To receive tier-1 capital injections, institutions were required to make 
full end-2000 provisions immediately and to forgo the transitional period 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a; BIS 1999). Though full end-2000 provisions 
were not necessary to participate in the tier-2 capital support facility, financial 
institutions that fully satisfied the end-2000 LCP rules could phase write-offs for debt 
restructuring over five years, which could temporarily relieve pressure to recapitalize 
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Financial institutions struggled in their 
attempts to meet end-2000 provisioning requirements because they had to severely 
write down existing capital (World Bank 2000a). 
Other changes to asset classification and provisioning requirements included the 
definitions of assets tied to debtors who underwent debt restructuring, and the 
relaxation of criteria for the deduction of collateral value from debtors’ accounts (BOT 
1999a). In the fourth quarter of 1998, the government made end-2000 provisioning fully 
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tax deductible—for both18 phased-in and up-front provisioning (Nimmanahaeminda and 
Sonakul 1998c). 
The BOT also altered capital requirements to allow financial institutions to use the 
capital support facilities (Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998a). Effective August 25, 
1998, the minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 8.5%—slightly above Basel 
standards—for commercial banks19 and 8% for finance companies and finance & 
securities companies (BOT 1998a). For all financial institutions, at least half of the CAR 
needed to be tier-1 capital (BOT 1998a). If financial institutions fully met the end-2000 
LCP requirements, they could count provisioning for “pass” assets as tier-2 capital—with 
“pass” assets not exceeding 1.25% of all risk-weighted assets (BOT 1998a). On August 5, 
1999, the BOT reversed the full end-2000 LCP requirement provision, so financial 
institutions could immediately count loan-loss provisions for “pass” assets as tier-2 
capital—subject to the same constraint of “pass” assets not exceeding 1.25% of all risk-
weighted assets (BOT 1999a). 
To incentivize the entry of foreign capital, government began to loosen restrictions on 
foreign ownership of Thai financial institutions in 1997 (Santiprabhob 2003). Effective 
June 27, 1997, the Emergency Decree Amending the Commercial Banking Act B.E. 2505 
(No. 2)20 lifted the 25% ceiling on foreign ownership on a case-by-case basis (BOT 
2000a). MOF allowed 100% foreign ownership by foreign investors who aimed to 
resolve or rehabilitate distressed financial institutions (BOT 2000a). With MOF approval, 
foreigners could possess majority ownership of locally incorporated financial 
institutions for up to 10 years; thereafter, the foreign owners could not acquire 
additional shares until the ownership interest (existing and new holdings) was 
maintained at 49% or less (Treasury 1998; BOT 2000a). Beginning in November 1998, 
MOF approval was no longer necessary for majority foreign ownership of Thai financial 
institutions (Treasury 1998). In the years immediately following the crisis, foreign 
ownership of Thai financial institutions increased through foreigners: (1.) purchasing a 
majority stake in private financial institutions from former Thai shareholders, (2.) 
purchasing a majority stake in privatized banks, or (3.) participating in new capital 
injections of financial institutions—particularly large private banks (Santiprabhob 
2003). 
 
18 At the beginning of the crisis, domestic tax code discouraged financial institutions from making full end-
2000 provisions because the amounts of provisions in excess of the BOT’s scheduled minima were still 
subject to taxation (Santiprabhob 2003). 
19 For foreign banks operating in Thailand, CAR was calculated with the capital in the local branch rather 
than the consolidated capital of the parent bank (Treasury 1998). 
20 This is also known as the “Alien Business Law” (ADB 1999). 
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Evaluations of the August 14 Package are mixed; researchers acknowledge that the 
program restored confidence in the Thai financial sector, yet the facilities saw low uptake. 
Santiprabhob (2003) suggested that the capital support facilities improved confidence in 
the Thai financial system and offered an emergency funding option to financial institutions 
(Santiprabhob 2003). After the government introduced the August 14 Package, prices of 
shares on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and SET’s banking sector index both 
improved (Santiprabhob 2003). In 2001, several World Bank employees conducted event 
studies on the signaling effects of interventions during the Asian Financial Crisis (Klingebiel 
et al. 2001). They calculated stock returns on bank indices using a three-day window: one 
day before, during, and after a given intervention’s initial announcement (Klingebiel et al. 
2001). The authors reported “excess returns”—returns on bank stocks in excess of returns 
on non-financial stocks—of +3.84%, which was different from zero at a significance level of 
0.05 (Klingebiel et al. 2001).  
When Thai Military Bank (TMB) was considering whether to apply for the program at a 
shareholder meeting on September 13, 1999, the Chairman of the Board of Directors spoke 
positively of TMB’s potential collaboration with the government, claiming that applying for 
capital support was advantageous because “the assistance will stabilize the Bank and 
provide enough capital for the Bank’s operation” (TMB 1999b). TMB’s President and CEO 
followed up the Chairman’s comments by highlighting the price advantage of the 
“subsidized” tier-1 capital, and shareholders unanimously voted for TMB to apply (TMB 
1999b). 
After receiving government assistance, TISCO Finance claimed, “The successful 
recapitalization process guarantees [TISCO Finance’s] ability to maintain its capital 
adequacy ratio in accordance with the Regulation of the Bank of Thailand” (TISCO 1999). 
The foremost criticism of the August 14 Package is that capital support facilities—
especially the tier-1 facility—were unpopular with banks (Cheung and Liao 2005). First, 
financial institutions found it challenging to meet end-2000 provisioning requirements, 
which meant that they had to severely write down existing capital (World Bank 2000a). 
Second, banks were wary of the management control that they would forfeit to the 
government if they were to participate in the tier-1 scheme (World Bank 2000a). At least 
one scholar evaluated the support facilities according to their broad effects on the financial 
system: Satitniramai (2007) contended that the capital support facilities were largely 
unsuccessful because the weak uptake limited both NPL resolution and credit expansion 
(Satitniramai 2007).  
Though the capital support facilities saw limited uptake, former BOT Governor Veerathai 
Santiprabhob described the strict participatory conditions as necessary to protect public 
funds (Santiprabhob 2003). Unpopular program features were meant to safeguard 
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taxpayers while also supporting financial institutions (Santiprabhob 2003). Researchers 
from the Japan Research Institute argued that the capital support facilities’ unpopularity 
softened in 1999 because non-performing loans rose, capital markets offered no alternative 
sources of capital, and financial institutions were required to sign MOUs containing plans to 
recapitalize (Takayasu and Yokoe 1999; Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998b).  
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of the Financial System Rehabilitation Plan (14 August 1998).” Press release, August 13, 
1999. 
Describes the “success” of the August 14 measures taken one year prior to the announcement.  
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https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/set-closes-below-400-point-psychological-mark. 
Key Academic Papers 
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